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Study of the evolution of an institution provides the insights
needed to examine it in its modern setting. Examination of history
provides the answers to the question, "How did this institution
become what it represents?" or "What are the roots of its philoso-
phy?" Since the relation of market regulation to the behavior of
firms and industries is an important part of any study in the area
of industrial organization, it is necessary to describe how regulation
developed in the political economy of the United States and
elsewhere.'
The following discussion brings together the basis for regulation
in the modern economy with the major highlights in the development
of market law. The evolution is traced from ancient times through
the medieval development of segmented market regulation to the
interpretation of English common law and thence toward the more
specific practices of market restriction.
THE BASIS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
There are at least three concepts which affect the choices the
consumer may make and the alternatives available in the market
place-needs, desires, and wants.
Under classical theory there were no problems in establishing
price. Price was either natural or market. Whenever the market
price exceeded the natural one, certain forces came into play and
brought them into balance.2 "The great power and attraction of
classical price theory lay in its simplicity and determinateness.
This determinateness was due to the fact that, in a market of
*Assistant Professor Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State Un-
iversity, Fargo, North bakota.
1. In support of this approach Stigler has said: "The very essence of scholarly ir-
responsibility is the assertion that the past is irrelevent to the future .... Stigler, In-
dustrial Organizataon and Economio Progress, THE STATE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 279
(1956).
2. See e.g Bell A History of Hoonom c Thought, RICARDO, DEVELOPER OF CLASSICAL
TRADITION 232'(1953). Bell discusses the natural and market price for labor divergence,
and convergence.
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competitive small-scale enterprise, price is the outcome of imper-
sonal forces." s Thus it has rightly been called a theory of value
mechanics. Wants were assumed known and homogeneous. They
were considered determinate.
In our modem society, however, the many factors that influence
demand are largely indeterminate. In such an environment the
consumer is not sovereign. Since he is not, he cannot clearly express
a perfect allocation between needs, desires, and wants through dollar
votes in the market place. When imperfect markets were conceptu-
alized,4 a great change in price theory occurred; the exceptions
became the rule. At the same time, with its greater scope, price
theory lost some of the simplicity and determinateness that it
possessed under the competitive approach. With the admission of
product differentiation, price discrimination, and advertising, "in-
dustry," "commodity," "cost," and "price" lost their precisely
definable meanings; the new theory seemed no longer able to offer
the exact solution of an "equilibrium price."5
Few economists now acknowledge any inherent reason why the
natural and the market price should coincide. On the one hand,
needs can be recognized, i.e., those conditions which, if present
and effective, would cause the individual or society to function with
the least friction and more in accordance with the natural order of
his universe. It would be difficult to discover or recognize such a
framework in the modern western world. Further, desires exist
which may be classified as human wants that are unexpressed but
that the individual or group subjectively wants, craves or would
want if encouraged to do so. Self-examination exposes an unending
stream of desires. Finally we can recognize wants defined as de-
mands expressed objectively."
Man is a unit satisfying needs and expressing desires and
demands. He functions as a part of a total institution, society, and
more or less as a member of several or few sub-institutions. The
major institution with which he associates himself is generally an
organization that combines the factors of production to produce
some output. These institutions are generally highly formalized.
Another of his roles, though in most instances less formalized, is
that of consumer.
As a consumer, man, by his nature, possesses certain desires
and objective demands beyond his needs. In a simplified society
where no rules existed, man could satisfy these wants in an un-
governed manner. However, each society possesses a set of formal-
3. Rothschild, Price Theory and Oligopoly, LVII THE EcoN omIc JOURNAL 300 (1947).
4. Probably the award for discovery should go to Chamberlin, THE THEORY OF MON-
OPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1950).
5. Rothschild, supra note 3, at 301, 302.
6. The definitions of needs, desires, and demands are found in BnTIEL, SOME POTENTI-
ALITES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS NEW BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 44, 45 (1957).
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ized or unformalized expressions of the wishes of the majority
regarding the limitations imposed upon man's desire to satisfy
these wants as he chooses. These may be the tablets handed down
from Mount Sinai or some variants of them. Though there certainly
are exceptions, man seems quite satisfied to repress his desire to
exploit as he chooses; this reflects his recognition of the importance
of orderly behavior.
Because man recognizes these simple limitations on his social
behavior, he is also capable of recognizing that these human phe-
nomena may be employed to define his behavior in other facets
of his individual or group existence.
Since the existence of man's desires and demands for food
are recognized, it should also be recognized that these are highly
exploitable senses. If the desires of man can be awakened and
objectively defined through the communication devices available
in the environment (advertising) and definable demands or wants
can thereby be created, exploitation can take place.7 What are the
consequences of allowing complete freedom in creating demand?
What becomes of the orderly market? How would producers proceed
not only to live with each other, but to let live? The maximizing
condition is always a part of economic theory in the so-called
textbook world of production. Thus the market would be full of
producers attempting to maximize. How does maximization occur
without prohititions? Is it possible without exploiting either re-
sources or consumption? Thus there exist very basic needs for
rules. Whether rules are based on emotion or experiment is important
only in considering their effectiveness.
Expanding government control over economic activity has
characterized life in the twentieth century.
HISTORICAL ROOTS
Commercial regulation is not unique to the twentieth century,
nor to the United States. Many economic functions were regulated
by government in ancient Greece, as Aristotle pointed out in his
Athenian Constitution. A code of law governing economic relations
was developed under the Roman Empire, and many principles
were deduced and applied to business by early governments and
by the early Catholic Church.8
Regulation can be traced through the Middle Ages. Medieval
business regulations under the feudal system were closely related
7. See Clodius, Operational Criteria for Public Programs Affecting Firm Entry ard
Erit, MARXET STRUCTURE RESEARcn 57 (1964). Buyers develop preferences for brand
names and company reputations whether based on experience or ignorance. Advertising
reinforces these preferences.
8. KOONTZ AND GABLE, PUBLIC CONTROL OF ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE 5 (1956) ; STEINER,
GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN ECoNomIC LiFE 45-61 (1953) ; Bell, supra note 2, at 30, 31.
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to the direction of the overlord. Custom also played a regulatory
role. Workers were expected to follow in the paths of their fathers.
Prices were supposed to be based upon previous prices, and the
producer was entitled only to a wage which would allow him to
maintain himself in the customary standard of living for his class.
The organization of guilds and the rise of municipalities provided
further sources of economic controls. In time the guilds became
permanent and closely regulated the economic conduct of their
members. Often the guilds, both craft and merchant, became official
parts of the town governments.9
The forerunner of modern economic control by the state is
regulation by the towns.
Between roughly 1400 and 1550, besides protecting guild
monopolies, towns undertook the licensing of traders and the
regulation of the time, place, buildings, and commodities of
markets, fairs, or large wholesale markets ....
In both the fairs and the towns trade was closely super-
vised. A body of rules, called the "law merchant" and based
largely upon custom. . . were for the most part business
regulations covering weights, measures, just price, fraudulent
sales, business contracts, and such trade practices as fore-
stalling, regrating, and engrossing. The law merchant, a sort
of business common law, developed over the years until it
covered not only the law of contracts, notes, and bills of
exchange, but widespread regulation of prices, service obli-
gations, and liabilities of those in "common," or public, and"private" callings. In these laws . . . are found the origins
of Anglo-Saxon hostility toward combination and monopoly.10
Obviously man has recognized the need for formal market control
for some time. Since his markets were small, his legal system was
simple and small. The important point though is that as long ago
as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries man recognized the prob-
lems associated with combination and monopoly and tried to outlaw
them. Here were the beginnings of Common Law as it referred
to markets.
Long before statutes condemning monopoly were enacted by
state and federal legislatures, its legality was questioned in cases
brought before the courts. Judges confronted by these issues looked
for precedents." An understanding of the provisions of our statutory
law is facilitated by examining court cases determined in the
common law system; these provide the precedents courts have
relied upon to impart meaning to statutory law.
9. KOONTZ AND GABLE, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 5, 6.
10. id. at 6, 7.
11. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIEs TOWARD BUSINESS 54 (1955).
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RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The fundamental legal concept underlying the interpretation of
our statutory law concerning economics and business has to do
with the notion of restraint of trade. 12 In the medieval period, where
fairly rigid obstacles were imposed on mobility both from one
trade to another and from one town to another, ancillary restraints
were generally considered unlawful. An artisan who sold his trade
and agreed not to compete with his buyer found it very difficult
to pursue his trade in some other locality or to enter a new trade.
The first instance of record that is generally recognized as de-
nouncing such restraints is Dyer's Case in 1415. Here one John
Dyer put forth a condition on the defendant, Lod, that he should
not use his art of a dyer's craft within a one half time period.
The court ruled that the obligation was void and the contract
unenforceable because the condition was against the common law.18
As mobility was increased through improved transportation
systems, the possibility of outside competition made such agree-
ments less objectionable. The law was then modified to permit
restraints when reasonably ancillary to the main purpose of the
sale provided that such restraints were not part of a monopolistic
scheme injurious to the public. The famous case of Mitchell v.
Reynolds14 succintly redefined the flavor of the law and the attitude
of the court. The plaintiff in this case leased a bakery from the de-
fendant for a period of five years on the promise that the defendant
would not engage in his trade in the parish for that period of time.
The promise was broken. The case was decided in favor of the
plaintiff. The implications of the pronouncement of the court were:
an ancillary contract in restraint of trade is presumed to be void
unless the restrictions it imposes on the vendor or lessor are
particular, and the grounds for the imposition of these restrictions
accounts for the fact that this case is claimed to have established
the "rule of reason" in evaluating the legal validity of restraints
of trade.1 5 The requirement that the restraint should be particular
faded away as markets widened. New interpretations concerning
general versus particular concepts are found in Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber.' 6 From the pronouncements of this case, an ancillary
12. A sharp distinction must be made between ancillary and nonacillary restraints.of
trade. An ancillary restraint is essentially a side agreement which is part of a major
contract or agreement typically involving the sale of a business, the lease of property,
the sale of professional practice, or the institution of an employer-employee relationship.
The ancillary or side agreement involves a promise on the part of the vendor or lessor
not to compete with the buyer or lessee. Nonancillary restraints constitute the main
transaction among the parties to the agreement. The immediate object of such agree-
ments is to restrict, restrain, or limit the competition among the parties to the agree-
ment. See PAPENDREOU AND WHEELER, COMPETITION AND ITS REGULATIONS 216-219 (1954).
13. See HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS 104 (1960). Y.B. 2
Hen. V, pl. 26 (1415). Also PAPANDREOU AND WHEELER, id. at 217; FAINSOD, GORDON, AND
PALAMOUNTAIN, Government and the American Economy 440 (1959).
14. 1 P. Wrns. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (M.B. 1711).
15. PAPANDREOU AND WHEELER, OP. Cit. upra note 12, at 217, 218.
16. 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
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restraint of trade will be upheld as valid and binding if it meets
the criterion of reasonableness. The reasonableness of contract will
be evaluated in terms of the interest of the vendor or lessor, the
vendee or lessee, and the public.
Nonancillary restraints are somewhat different; according to
Papandreou and Wheeler, generalizations as to the legal status of
such agreements at common law are quite risky.1" The underlying
theme is always the reduction of the freedom of competitors to
act independently. This relates the concept to what we know as
collusive behavior. These authors cite Milton Handler, A Study of
the Construction and Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Laws,"8 who
has delineated three discernible philosophies of the courts prior to
1890.
According to the first, nonancillary agreements were unlawful.
No extenuating circumstances or appeals to the rule of reason
were permitted. According to both the second and third, an appeal
to the rule of reason could be made. The second states that a
nonancillary restraint might be upheld if the firms entering the
arrangement constituted a small segment of the group in the market.
According to the third, however, arrangements which involved the
majority or even the totality of the firms in a market might be
upheld, provided their power had not been abused. Reasonableness
depended on the objectives and behavior of the firms rather than
on their number. If they pursued reasonable price and output policies,
their arrangement would be upheld.
The first trend has become the entrenched official attitude of
American courts. Cases cited are: Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie9
and Beckelew v. Martens.20 The first case concerned a monopoly
that would have resulted from the agreement, while the latter
concerned price fixing agreements. It is interesting to note
that the Central Ohio case precedes the anti-trust laws of
the United States, while the Beckelew case follows both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts but precedes the Robinson-Patman
Act. The second trend is epitomized by Ontario Salt Co. v.
The Merchants Salt Co. 21 Here the object was not monopoly, but
the raising of the price of salt which was found illegal under the
old common law offenses of engrossing and as being against public
policy. The third trend is expressed in Skrainka v. Scharringhansen
22
and Herriman v. Menzies.28 In the first case the court found that
the agreement did not embrace all producers in the market and
17. PAANDREOV AND W EELER, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 220. The other authors cited
previously make no mention of the distinction between ancillary and nonancillary re-
straints of trade contracts.
18. TNEC Monograph No. 38, U.S. Government Printing Office 4, 5 (1941).
19. 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880).
20. 108 N.J.L. 339, 156 Atl. 436 (1931).
21. 18 Grant's Ch. fRep. 540 (1871).
22. 8 Mo. App. 622 (1880).
23. 115 Cal. 16, 44 Pac. 660 (1896).
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therefore did not provide any evidence of mischief, nor would it
tend to deprive men of employment, unduly raise prices, cause
a monopoly, or put an end to competition. Herriman was upheld
on grounds that there was no monopoly because all parties in
the market were not included, and further because prices to be
charged were not unreasonable.
The common law doctrine of restraint of trade was likewise
introduced into American law. The earliest case, Pierce v. Fuller,
24
involved a restraint concerned with the running of a second stage
between Boston and Providence. The court held the restraint valid
saying that such restraints are valid in particular places if executed
for sufficient and reasonable consideration.25
In 1839 the New York Supreme Court upheld a contract by
which the operator of a line of packet boats between Buffalo and
Rochester on the Erie Canal bought out his rival on condition
that the latter would forfeit a bond if he reentered business on that
run at any time.2 6 It was not until 1847 that a contract suppressing
competition was voided in America. 27 One year later the court
reaffirmed the applicability of this rule to contracts in restraint of
trade, but also stated that the agreement would have been void
at common law since the restraint imposed was unreasonable.28
As a result of these several cases, a restraint doctrine evolved
along two lines:
1. All nonancillary (general) restraints were illegal.
2. Ancillary (partial) restraints, as to time and place, were
valid if made for a valuable consideration in the sale
of a business or property.
Again it should be noted that the cases mentioned precede the
statutory antitrust legislation in the United States.
29
MONOPOLY
Though monopoly and restraint of trade share some common
elements, they are not identical. Restraint of trade refers to some
constraint on the freedom of a producer to exercise a trade of
24. 8 Mass. 223 (1811).
25. MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 197 (1955). Within the next fifteen years the
same court three times affirmed the legality of a contractual restraint designed to sup-
press competition. See DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAw 127, n. 16 (1959).
26. Chappel v. Brockwater, 21 Wend. 157, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1839).
27. Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Den. 349, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1847). The court set aside tile
ruling of a referee in Chancery which would have compelled the defendant to pay dam-
ages because he had failed to fulfill his part of a pooling arrangement among bargemen
on the Erie Canal. In this case the court relied not so much upon the unreasonableness
of the restraint as upon an obscure and seldom enforced provision of a New York statute
which condemned as a misdemeanor any conspiracy to commit any act injurious to trade
or commerce.
28. Stanton v. Allen, 5 Den. 434, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1848).
29. The Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 together
express the basic antitrust policy of the United States.
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his own choice. 80 This branch of law, however, can be extended
to cover restraints upon competition, that is, agreements whereby
the parties seek to exclude others from the market. 1 This leads
the analysis into the concept of monopoly which is in fact a restraint
upon competition.
The word monopoly is interesting, and its genesis partially
explains why the control of prices by private acts was designated
as monopoly in early literature. The Greed word "monopoly" did
not find its way into England until about 1516. The term monopolium
was current in Medieval Latin by the thirteenth century and was
then used to designate a public grant as well as illegal conspiracies
with respect to prices and the control of supply.3 2 Mund states
that "monopoly" first appeared in England in 1516 in Sir Thomas
More's Utopia. In 1602 the term "monopoly" was added to the
English law to describe the patents which Queen Elizabeth had
been granting her favorites for the exclusive manufacture and sale
of many products other than new inventions.
The original attitude of the English common law was generally
antimonopolistic. Grants of monopolies were made by the crown
through its role as arbiter of commerce. These privileges are known
to have been extended to individual private persons at least from
the time of Edward III. They were granted to encourage the devlop-
ment of some new trade or the introduction into Great Britain of
some foreign industry. This policy was vigorously followed by the
Tudors. Later, under Elizabeth I and James I, patents came to be
granted as a form of political patronage to persons who had done
nothing to improve technique or to establish new trades.88
The first instance of discontent appeared in 1602. The abuse of
the prerogative of government to encourage and reward inventors,
designers, and writers led to widespread protests not only by con-
sumers who were injured by high prices, but also by enterprisers
and workmen who were excluded from a common calling.84 In
Darcy v. Allen,835 the grant of a monopoly in the manufacture,
import, and sale of playing cards was challenged. The court held
that a public grant restricting a trade to one or to a few persons
was void because it was a monopoly. 86 The court stated that mo-
nopoly is accompanied by three inseparable incidents:
1. The raising of prices.
2. The lowering of the quality of the commodity.
3. The tendency to impoverish divers, artificers, and others
30. WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 11, at 195.
31. FAINSOD, GORDON, AND PALAMOUNTAIN, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 440.
32. MUND, op. cit. supra note 25, at 196.
33. ROBINSON, MO NOPOLY 262, 254 (1949).
34. MUND, op. cit. supra note 2.
35. 11 Co. Rep. 84, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. 1602).
36. MUUD, op. cit. supra note 25; RoBiNsoN, op. oit. supra note 83.
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who before by their labour had maintained themselves
and their families, but who now will of necessity be
constrained to live in idleness and beggary."T
Since acts with these consequences were against the common law,
the court reasoned that monopoly was also contrary to the common
law.
James I was unwilling to accept this position. He had no desire
to acknowledge restraint on what he considered to be his royal
prerogatives. The royal favorites continued to receive monopoly
grants in scandalous fashion.8 s
To combat this behavior the Parliament passed the Statute of
Monopolies in 1624. It embodied the common law framework by
stating that all monopolies, except letters patent, were absolutely
void. The letters patent favor was maintained to encourage the
innovation of ideas and technology. The monopoly against which
this legislation was aimed was complete control of production
or sale, resulting from a special legal grant or privilege. 9 This
act was evaded, sometimes openly, other times by the device of
the creation of chartered companies by the later Stuarts. After
the passing of the Bill or Rights in 1689, the crown could grant
monopolies only with parliamentary approval. Patents and copy-
rights, however, were granted without reference to parliament.40
The growth of industry and markets in the United States in-
creased the opportunity for individuals to combine to arrange
market sharing. Restraint of price competition became increasingly
popular. Various states attempted to combat the movement by
designating such acts as contracts in restraint of trade. This intro-
duced an ambiguity into the law. For example, in Morris Run Coal
Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 41 an agreement of five coal corporations
to divide sales in certain proportions and to fix the prices of coal
was held to be a restraint of trade so great as to interfere with
the public interest.
The general rule relied upon was that all contracts in restraint
of trade are illegal unless it can be shown that they are made upon
adequate consideration and upon circumstances that are reasonable
and useful. Thus an agreement made by a person in selling his
business not to compete with the buyer does not, in itself, raise
prices, reduce the supply, or otherwise injure the public; whereas
an agreement among competitors on supply or prices invariably
has these consequences. The court, in making its decision in this
case, made the validity of the restraint turn on the "reasonableness"
of an agreement not to compete which amounted to a nonancillary
37. FAINSOD, GORDON, AND PALAMOUNTAIN, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 440, 441.
38. PEGRUM, THE REGULATION OF INDUSTRY 205 (1949).
39. Ibid.
40. ROBINSON Op cit. supra note 33, at 253.
41. 68 Pa. 173, i85-186 (1871).
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restraint, and by law nonancillary restraints were held to be
invalid .42
Three patterns can be noted at this point. First, the courts
were leaning upon reasonableness as a criteria for decisions. Thus
a "rule-off-reason" appears to have been developing in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. Second, markets were becoming
larger and more complex, and transportation was bringing them
closer together. This facilitated the third trend which is that indi-
viduals were finding it easier to get together and new types of
restraints were evolving from the changing market structures. The
courts found themselves arguing with the concept of monopoly.
The peculiar meaning attached to the term "monopoly" in
England was transferred to America. For many decades the
American courts used the word in its specialized sense. Justice
Story, in the Charles River Bridge case, defined monopoly as "an
exclusive right granted to a few, of something which was before
of common right. '4 Subsequently, the term was also used to de-
scribe a public franchise granted by the legislature for a public
benefit. The fact that the courts' attitude toward restraints or
combination concerned reasonableness implied that monopoly was
a relevant issue. In many cases the court resorted to concepts such
as a "tendency to monopoly" or "scheme to effectuate a monopoly"
as a basis for rendering their decisions. The general rationalization
was that ancillary restraints do not create monopolies because
others may enter the business and compete even though the agree-
ment precludes one specific vendor from entering the market."
The latter nineteenth century or post-Civil War period became
the period when "to monopolize" began to appear as a meaningful
term. Pools of every variety were held illegal in various states
during the second half of the nineteenth century. 45
The earliest and most familiar antimonopoly legislation or action
evolved through the Granger grievances against the railroads.
Western farmers felt that the railroads were somehow responsible
for their economic difficulties, and they believed lower rates were
42. MuTND, op. cst. supra note 25 at 198.
43. Charles River Bridge Co. v. Varren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
44. PAPANDREOU AND WHEELER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 261. See Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887) where the rourt argued: "It has some-
times been suggested that the doctrine that contracts in general restraint of trade arevoid, is founded in part upon the policy of preventing monopolies, which are opposed to
the liberty of the subject, and the granting of which by the king under claim of royal
prerogative led to conflicts memorable In English history. But convenants of the character
of the one now in question operate simply to prevent the covenantor from engaging in the
business which he sells so as to protect the purchaser in the enjoyment of what he has
purchased. To the extent that the contract prevents the vendor from carrying on the
particular trade, It deprives the community of any benefit it might derive from his enter-
ing into competition. But the business is open to all others, and there is little danger
that the public will suffer harm from lack of persons to engage in a profitable in-
dustry ....
45. FAINSOD, GORDON, AND PALAMOUNTAIN, Op cit. supra note 13, at 441. They [pools]
included agreements to control output, to divide market territory, to pool earnings, and to
employ a common sales agency to effectuate price control. The impossibility of holding
defaulting members of a pool to their agreement through ordinary legal processes was




their only relief. They complained about high freight rates, gross
and personal discriminations, unscrupulous promoters, and dis-
courteous treatment of travelers and shippers." The control of the
railroads by eastern capitalists aggravated the situation, for the
farmers felt they were victims of absentee ownership. The railroad
was pictured as a giant octopus sucking the life blood of the people,
and railway managers were likened to the robber barons of the
Middle Ages .
4
The Granger Laws were the outcome of these complaints.
Between 1869 and 1875 five states-Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minne-
sota, and Missouri-enacted railroad laws. Some of the laws pre-
scribed schedules of maximum charges. Other features such as the
pro rata clauses 4" attempted to preserve competition by forbidding
the combination of competing lines. Prohibitions against providing
free passes to public officials were also included. The repeal of the
Granger Laws did nothing to quiet the publics and in 1887 the
Interstate Commerce Commission was set up to regulate the
railroads.
The importance of the Granger Laws, for our purposes, is that
they led to the Granger cases which represented the first clear
victory for the public's right to regulate. The most important of
the Granger cases, even though not involving a railroad, is Munn
v. Illinois." In taking steps to enforce an 1871 Illinois warehouse
law, the state authorities brought action against Munn and Scott,
owners of grain elevators in Chicago for failure to take out licenses
as required by law. Munn and Scott appealed to the courts claiming
that the legislation deprived them of property without due process
of law. The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the legislation on the
grounds of benefits to the public welfare. The court declared that
the warehouse owners were "an organized combination of monopolists
• . . with but one heart, and that palpitating for excessive gains." 1
The decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court
where Justice Waite, in writing the majority opinion, said:
... Property does become clothed with a public interest
when used in a manner to make it of public consequence,
46. Farmers had been quite generous to the railroad companies and had lavished
subsidies on them. In many Instances farmers had personally subscribed to railroad stock
and often mortgaged their farms to do it. They had been led to expect generous dividends
on railroad stock and better prices for farm products. The railroad stock often turned
out to be worthless, and the higher prices sometimes failed to materialize. The farmers,
as taxpayers, also had to pay off the bonds voted to provide subsidies for railroads which
showed their Ingratitude by injurious discriminations. See LOcKLIN, EcoNoMIcs or TRANS-
PORTATION 210, 211 (1954).
47. Id. at 211.
48. The pro rata clauses provided that rates should not be higher for shorter than for
longer hauls. They were the forerunners of modern "long-and-short-haul" clauses.
49. The repeal occurred because (1) there was feeling that the laws were frightening
capital from railroad enterprises, (2) the railroads waged a vigorous campaign to convince
the people that Grange legislation was harmful to business and agricultural Interests of
the states, and (3) the laws were in some cases unsound due to their extreme provisions,
crudeness, and enactment with little thought or experience.
50. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
51. Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80, 93 (1873).
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and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing use;
but so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the
control .... 52
In upholding the Illinois statute the Court introduced into
American law the doctrine that direct price control is justified in
the case of businesses "affected with a public interest." When does
the use of property make it of public consequence? The court
indicated that it is primarily when property is used in business
activity under conditions which involve some degree of monopoly. 3
THE TRUST ARRANGEMENT
The trust was an arrangement whereby the owners of stock in
two or more companies transferred their securities to a set of
trustees, receiving in return certificates which entitled them to share
in the pooled earnings of the jointly managed companies." A trust
was simply a type of combination that arose from integration of
enterprise under single ownership or control. The example was set
by the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, which established a trust
in 1879, which later controlled 90 percent of the refining capacity
of the country. The success of the Standard Oil Trust invited
imitation, and, in the course of the next 10 years, a large number
of other combinations were formed on the same bases.
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The limitations of the common law faith in freedom of trade
as a consumer safeguard first became apparent with the rise of
the railroads, but they were driven home forcefully by the success
and the proliferation of the trusts in the 1880's. So successful were a
few of these that the use of the term "trust" became the designation
of all monopolistic combinations as well as joint actions by inde-
pendent concerns for the purpose of controlling the market and
limiting competition. Among those that utilized the Standard Oil
trustee device were the linseed oil trust and the sugar trust. Some
large single combines also emerged, among them the American
Tobacco Company, and the United States Rubber Company. Of
far more importance, however, was the use of the various kinds
of pools and simple price agreements (known as "gentlemen's
agreements"). These arrangements were used to control output
and prices but proved to be rather unstable in the face of the law
52. ANDERSON, GOVERNMENT AND BusrNEss 271 (1960).
53. MUND, op. cit. supra note 25, at 504, 505.
54. DEwE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 140.
55. P RUM, op. oit. supra note 38, at 158.
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and in the absence of effective means for compelling adherence
to them.
5 6
Two cases of prime importance outlawed the trust. In People v.
North River Sugar Refining Co., 57 the lower New York courts
vacated the defendant company's charter on grounds that it had
no legal authority to join the sugar trust or to place control of its
affairs in the hands of another organization. The Court of Appeals,
however, refused to follow the lower court in declaring the sugar
trust itself to be against public policy, restricting its decision solely
to the question of corporate powers of the North River Company.
In State v. Standard Oil Co., 58 the Ohio Supreme Court went further
and held the oil trust itself to be an unlawful monopoly. The court
held that entry into the trust by the corporation was an ultra vires
action, and that the objective of creating a monopoly was contrary
to the policy of the State of Ohio.
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The cottonseed oil and whiskey trusts were likewise attacked
successfully in Tennessee and Nebraska. 0 From then on the trust
proper was abandoned, and later, substitute organizations were
attacked by the state courts and defeated.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century both the states and
the federal government lost control over the development of giant
monopolistic corporations. This was a period when single corporate
entities were acquiring almost exclusive control over the production
of one basic manufactured commodity after another, and they did
not hesitate to use their monopoly powers. In the Wabash decision,
the court held that power over interstate commerce was exclusive
with the Congress and that if the Congress did not act the states
could not. 1
Fainsod, Gordon, and Palamountain neatly summarize the
situation:
Judicial declarations of public policy-endorsed competi-
tion as an automatic regulating device for ensuring the public
welfare. No highly defined economic theory went into the
decisions. . . . The growth of the combination movement in
the face of these legal obstacles proved the common law to
be inadequate. Loose agreements of the pooling variety were
generally brought into court only when some disgruntled
member began an action or was himself sued for noncom-
pliance. Remedies were difficult to enforce and rarely suc-
ceeded in restoring competition. . . . The law offered no
positive hindrance, and it was silent until spoken to, i.e.,
until someone brought a case into court. . . . The common
56. Id. at 142, 143.
57. 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890).
58. 49 Ohio 187, 30 N.E. 279 (1892).
59. PEGRUM, op. cit. supra note 38, at 159.
60. Mallory v. Hanaur Oil-Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396 (1888); State v. Nebraska
Distilling Company, 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155 (1890).
61. Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
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law was state wide only . . . and there was no uniformly
applicable federal common law. It became clear that if the
trust problem were to be attacked by forbidding and breaking
up monopolistic enterprises, statutory enactments and ad-
ministrative machinery were essential.
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Although it is implied that federal legislation was needed, the
states first initiated statutory antitrust laws.
As public oppostion to the trust crystallized and the weaknesses
of case law became apparent, the states began enacting antimonopoly
laws. Beginning with Kansas in 1887, nineteen states had either
enacted statutory antitrust laws or had written amendments to their
constitutions restricting such economic activity. 63 Forty-one states
now have antitrust laws of one kind or another.6 '
But this says nothing. Merely noting how many and which ones
did or did not provide for antimonopoly legislation says only that
there was considerable excitement generating in the latter nine-
teenth century society against "bigness." The number of states
that passed antitrust laws is irrelevant, since the impossibility of
dealing with interstate problems on the state level is fundamental.
In most states such laws have never been enforced. Appropriations
for enforcement have been meager.65 Officials have been deterred
from bringing suits by the fear that such action might discourage
the entry of new industries or drive existing industries to other
states. Consider a contemporary midwestern state with an anti-
monopoly minded attorney general or a judicial system heavily
burdened with backlogs of antimonopoly cases. How could an indus-
trial development administration rationalize such activity to a cor-
porate organization?
Even those states which halfheartedly attempted to deal with
the issue found that the interstate nature of most industries made
litigation or enforcement fruitless.6 6 It was not difficult for legal
ingenuity, in the absence of federal action, to escape the effects
of state legislation. Thus, says Alfange:
... The states could not regulate because state regulation
interfered with interstate commerce or violated due process;
but neither could the federal government regulate, because
as soon as federal regulation was attempted, the activities
aimed at were declared to be local and the exercise of
national power was barred as violative of states' rights.
Thus, big business was able to play the states against the
national government and the national government against
the states.6 7
62. FAINSOD, GORDON, AND PALAMOUNTAIN, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 443.
63. KOONTZ AND GABLE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 327.
64. FAINSOD, GORDON AND PALAMOUNTAIN, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 445.
65. WILCOX, op. cit. supra note 11, at 57.
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Aside from Greco-Roman allusions to the law as an independent
variable in society, the primary basic philosophy seems to stem
from the church or probably more basic yet, the precepts of religion.
Religions basically teach that man must consider other men as
"brethren" or analogous creatures. Applying this concept to com-
mercial ventures, the church was vocal about the nature of com-
mercial behavior. Since the church was, in fact, the government
during medieval times, church leaders had a great deal to say on
this topic. For example, Luther said:
The merchants have among themselves one common aim,
which is their chief maxim and the basis of all their sharp
practices. They say: I may sell my goods as dear as I can.
This they think their right.
Now what good is there in trade? ... On this basis
trade can be nothing else than robbing and stealing other
peoples' property ....
The rule ought to be, not: I may sell my wares as dear
as I can or will, but: I may sell my wares as dear as I ought,
or as is right and proper. But where are such merchants?
There are some who buy up the entire supply of certain
goods or wares in a country or a city, so that they may
have those goods solely in their own power and can fix and
raise the price and sell them as dear as they like or can
... . The imperial and temporal laws forbid this and call it
"monopoly," i.e., purchase for self-interest, which is not to
be tolerated in city or country, and princes and lords would
stop it and punish it if they did their duty. Merchants who
do this act just as though God's creatures and God's goods
were made for them alone and given to them alone, and as
though they could take them from other people and set on
them whatever price they chose.68
The nature of the religious limitations on activities that tend
to exploit others is obvious. There were two instruments to control
behavior:
1. The princes and lords had a responsibility to stop such
activity.
2. Even if they ignored their responsibility as the govern-
ment entity, this should not preclude the merchant from
observing an even greater power-the natural law.
Apparently it was not unusual for the theologian to act as the jurist.
In fact, Luther said:
68. On Trading and Usuary, KERR, A COMPEND OF LUTHER'S THEOLOGY 184, 185; IV
WORKS OF MARTIN LUTHER 12-27.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
. . . We theologians and jurists must continue, or all
the rest will go to ruin with us; this will not fail. When the
theologian disappears, God's Word also disappears, and there
remains nothing but heathen, nay, nothing but devils; when
the jurists disappear, then the law disappears, and peace
with it, and there remains nothing but robbery, murder,
crime and violance, nay, nothing but wild beasts. 69
Although Luther could be said to epitomize the Church of the
sixteenth century,70 the religious influence should realistically be
traced to St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas looked upon the state as
an association divinely instituted to impel
. . . Towards the common good of the many, over and
above that which impels toward the private good of each
individual; to make possible virtuous living through estab-
lishment of peace, guidance to good deeds, and provision of
a sufficiency of the things required for proper living; and
to enable men through virtuous living to attain to the pos-
session of God.71
Actually, however, Aquinas restricted the role of the state and
emphasized the ultimate regulative influence of the moral principles
of the church. Coordination could be achieved without the inter-
ference of the state. Market institutions such as the guilds could
perform this function through the control they had over their
individual members. This, of course, does not mean that in competi-
tion economic order and liberty will be preserved.
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These two gentlemen well symbolize the doctrine of the relation-
ship between men. Their religious precepts were pervasive. God's
ways represented all that was "good," and what was good for
man as a member of a religious organism, likewise was good for
him as a member of a commercial organism.
Political Economy
Nonreligious entities also form an important part of this basic
framework. The Physiocrats, who are generally known through the
writings of Francois Quesnay and his Tableau Economique (1758),
devised a system which assumed that there were natural laws
governing man and the universe.78 To attain true satisfaction in
69. A Sermon on Keeping Children in School, A COMPEND OF LUTHER'S THEOLOGY 188;
WORKS OF MARTIN LUTHER 173.
70. At least the protestant genus. Those with a bent toward Calvin should recall that
he did not imply the taking of profits as bad which implies the methodology is not to be
defined, but rather what became of profits was the central criteria to good business be-
havior. The concept of the nonadventurous corporation depicts this idea. But this defines
a system where the distribution of the residuals is perfect and thus precludes a need for
law.
71. Spengler, The Problem of Order in Economic Affairs, ESSAYS IN ECONOMic
THOUGHT: ARISTOTLE TO MARSHALL 13, n. 17 (1960) cites ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON THE
GOVERNANCE OF RULERS 35-36, 97-104.
7 2. Ibid.
73. MCCONIELL, ECONOMISTS PAST AND PRESENT: BASIC TEACHINGS OF THE GREAT EcoN-
OMISTS 12 (1958).
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life it was necessary only to discover these laws and conform to
them. Quesnay's belief in the existence of a natural order of things
which would serve man's purpose better than the existing order
led to other ideas of a modern cast. He believed that every
individual should seek the greatest amount of pleasure for the least
effort, as this would ensure rather than endanger the natural order.
Physiocracy gave birth to the famous doctrine of laissez-faire,
laissez-passer, i.e., let things proceed without interference. The work
of the legislator was to aid in the discovery of natural laws, not to
interfere with their operation by artifiical control. The basic thesis
of Quesnay's writing, for our purposes, is that a contingently self-
adjusting competitive system can conciliate diverse economic
interests and produce justice.7
4
Although Quesnay symbolized the movement, others wrote in
the same vein. Consider Letrosne who wrote: "Where there is
competition and complete freedom of exchange, 'natural price' (the
scholastic's 'just price') results, the interest of everyone is sub-
served, the interest of no one is hurt, and the interests of all
individuals are equilibrated in such wise as to preserve the social
order."75
These ends were achieved only when men and the community
acted in consistence with the natural order and its inviolable
natural laws. Since the basic laws of the natural order were
knowable, the Physiocrats expected to secure economic order
through:
1. Education: Knowledge of the necessary laws and rules
would be disseminated and underlying values would be-
come more completely integrated.
2. Coercion: The prince, or the legal despot, would declare
positive laws which expressed the laws of the natural
order and which were calculated to maximize the welfare
of the population.
The final propositions to be examined are those of Adam Smith.
Throughout the nineteenth century and for some time later, three
presumptions pervaded economic thought:
1. That the economic system is an automatically self-adjust-
ing mechanism.
2. That the economic role of the state should be narrowly
restricted.
3. That given these two conditions, the interests of individu-
als are harmonized with each other and with the general
interest about as well as may be expected.
74. Spengler, supra note 71, at 17.
75. Id. at 7, n. 33.
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These propositions had their origin in the writings of Adam Smith.70
Smith's early work, Theory of Moral Sentiments, develops his
system of ethics on the basis of a doctrine of harmonious order in
nature guided by God, and incidentally applies his general doctrine
to the economic order.7 7 In his later work, Wealth of Nations, Smith
devotes himself to a specialized inquiry into the nature of the
economic order.
Although economic writers do not consistently agree on what
Smith was attempting to say in his Wealth of Nations, most agree
that he would narrowly restrict the activities of government. In his
one deliberate and comprehensive generalization dealing with the
proper functions of the state, Smith declared:
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign
has only three duties to attend to; . . . first, the duty of pro-
tecting the society from the violence and invasion of other
independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as
far as possible, every member of the society from the in-
justice or oppression of every other member of it, or the
duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and
thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public
works and certain public institutions, which it can never
be for the interest of any individual, or small number of
individuals to erect and maintain; because the profit could
never repay the expense to any individual or small number
of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than
repay it to a great society.78
Going from Moral Sentiments to Wealth of Nations, we can see
that Smith believed in: first, a natural order, and second, minimal
governmental interference in this order. He believed that nature
provided the key to a harmonious world in industry, commerce,
and agriculture.7 9 This does not mean that he did not oppose
monopoly. He felt that a. "temporary" monopoly under the guise of
rewarding a joint-stock company for the cost of their adventure
was perhaps not unreasonable, but
... upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought
certainly . . . to be taken into the hands of the government,
their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be
laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual
monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very
absurdly in two different ways; first by the high price of
goods, which, in the case of free trade, they could buy
76. Id. at 18.
77. Viner, Adam Smith and Laissez Faire, ESSAYS IN ECoNoMIC THOUGHT: ARISTOTLE
TO MARSHALL 307 (1960).
78. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, IV THE
MODEN LIBRARY 651. (Cannan ed. 1937).
79. Bell, A History of Economic Thought, RICARDO, DEVELOPER OF CLASSICAL TRADITION
190 (1953).
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much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from
a branch of business, which it might be both convenient and
profitable for many of them to carry on.80
In Wealth of Nations, Smith considers man as necessarily selfish;
through this innate selfishness, man is prompted to better his
condition and thereby improve the common good. "It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner but from their regard for their own self-interest." '81
Human institutions which interfere with this principle in the name
of the public interest defeat their own end; when restraining
measures are taken away, natural liberty will reestablish itself.82
Thus Smith established a stream of thought that maintained a
market mechanism rooted in the natural order of things. Government
was external to the market-a referee; its function was to maintain
competition. Man, through his propensity to truck, barter, and
trade, while improving his own lot, would therefore automatically
improve the lot of society. Only when monopoly appeared to be
interfering with the market by exerting artificial control would
government need to express its authority.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a background for the type of regulatory experience
previously dealt with has been developed, i.e., the common law.
At best, the interference was minimal. Considering the narrow
definitions of misdirected market behavior that have been discussed
in the previous pages, 3 it is not surprising to find a general lack
of effective activity by the public and its agencies in pre-twentieth
century society.
Further, the very basic court decisions had been laid down
by the philosophers of the day who tried to solve the problem of
the efficient allocation of resources. Their theoretical knowledge
was insuffficient for the task. The concept of size economies surely
escaped them. Certainly they could not envisage the complex mar-
kets we have today. The principles of perfect competition, applicable
to the small markets of that time continued to be applied to the
changing market structure of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The concept of liberty, in nearly all cases, implied freedom
from external authority. The market could very well get along
without interference if man merely behaved according to religious
principles and maintained the natural order. Surely if nature could
flourish through self-control, man could follow its example.
80. Smith, supra note 78, at 712.
81. Id. at 14.
82. Bell states that these interpretations of Smith's are open to severe criticism, but
they are commonly accepted.
83. Recall the restricted definition of monopoly.
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the concept
of liberty became muddled. The maintenance of "freedom" in the
market was not necessarily equated with "liberty." Exploitation of
the weak became the norm rather than the exception. A gradual
realization of the need for an external force to guarantee that
"freedom equals liberty" in the market place was becoming
apparent.
As Emile Durkheim puts it:
. . . To be sure, the strongest succeed in completely
demolishing the weakest, or in subordinating them. But ...
if all authority of this kind is wanting, the law of the strongest
prevails, latent or active, the state of war is necessarily
chronic.
That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite
evident, since it runs counter to the aim of society. . . . To
justify this chaotic state, we vainly praise its encouragement
of individual liberty. Nothing is falser than this antagonism
too often presented between legal authority and individual
liberty. Quite on the contrary, liberty (we mean genuine
liberty, which it is society's duty to have respected) is itself
the product of regulation. I can be free only to the extent
that others are forbidden to profit from their physical, eco-
nomic, or other superiority to the detriment of my liberty.
But only social rules can prevent abuses of power.84
Hence, the setting was clear for the first of the major antitrust
acts, the Sherman Act of 1890.
84. DUREHEIM, THE DIvisION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 2, 3 (1949).
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